Counterfeit aircraft parts: one rogue operator, or a growing concern?

The SFO recently announced that it had charged a company director with fraudulent trading in connection with its investigation of a company, AOG Technics Ltd (“AOG Technics”).  AOG Technics is alleged to have sold uncertified parts for passenger and cargo aircraft engines.

Aircraft in the UK and globally were grounded in 2023 after the CAA, FAA and EASA each issued safety alerts to airlines that may have bought or installed AOG Technics’ parts.  The issuing of these alerts followed a TAP Air Portugal technician discovering an aircraft engine part that appeared to be used rather than the new part the airline had ordered.

AOG Technics is alleged to have defrauded its customers – which included airlines, maintenance providers and parts suppliers – by falsifying documentation that related to the origin, status and condition of aircraft parts; and its director, Jose Alejandro Zamora Yrala, is accused of operating AOG Technics for a fraudulent purpose.  A trial date has now been fixed for January 2028, with an estimated trial length of six weeks reflecting the complexity of the matter.

While the above prosecution does not appear to relate to anything more than a single, rogue operator, media reports suggest that the use of counterfeit and uncertified parts within the aviation industry may be growing – particularly in Russia.

Sanctions imposed on Russia since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine have restricted the supply of legitimate parts for use in Russian aircraft.  In response, the Russian Government has been forced to take desperate measures to keep Russia’s fleet of commercial passenger aircraft flying.  In 2023, Russia legalised the cannibalisation of existing aircraft for spare parts and Russian manufacturers are reported to be producing uncertified copies of Boeing and Airbus spare parts for use domestically.  In addition, press reports suggest that parts exported by firms in the UK and elsewhere have continued to find their way to Russia, via intermediary organisations, with an estimated US$1bn of Western aircraft parts smuggled into the country since 2022.  This has led to growing concerns that counterfeit and/or uncertified parts are being installed in aircraft operating both within the Russian domestic market and on routes between Russia and ‘friendly’ countries. 

The safety risks associated with the use of aircraft parts that have not been certified as airworthy are clear and high, and accidents have been attributed to bogus aircraft parts such as that involving Partnair Flight 394 in 1989.  Complete and detailed records of certifications, approvals and maintenance events (so-called ‘back-to-birth’ traceability) are important for ensuring regulatory compliance and for safeguarding the economic value of aircraft components, especially for life-limited parts.

While Russian aircraft are not currently permitted to enter UK or EU airspace, this is unlikely to be the case forever.  If the political situation develops so that such sanctions are in due course lifted, concerns that aircraft that may contain counterfeit and/or uncertified parts may re-enter UK airspace, and that such parts may find their way into pools of spares, will quickly become front-of-mind for relevant operators and authorities in the UK. 

The 16^th package of sanctions against Russia announced by the EU this year extended the ban on operating within European airspace to include third-county (i.e., non-Russian) carriers either operating domestic flights within Russia or supplying aircraft components to Russian airlines or for domestic flight in Russia – demonstrating that this threat is already recognised by UK and EU authorities.

If and when Russian airlines begin to operate in Europe again, operators, maintenance providers and authorities alike will need to maintain a high level of vigilance in their interactions with Russian-owned and -maintained aircraft.  Before then, businesses involved in buying and selling aircraft spares need to continue applying a high level of scrutiny to their transactions and will need to carefully consider the likely identity of any end users to ensure that their goods do not end up in Russia, potentially placing them in breach of UK, US and EU sanctions regimes (and in turn presenting money laundering issues that will need to be navigated carefully).

If you would like to discuss the impact of issues raised in this article on your business, please contact Chloe Challinor or Patrick Bettle of our aviation regulatory team, or Guy Bastable, Andrew Matheson or Sam Aldous of our corporate crime team.