Headline Summary

The recent decision of R v Osmond [2026] EWCA Crim 979 is the first time the Court of Appeal has considered the scope of the “tipping off” offence under section 333A(3) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. While the issues relating to the offence that were under appeal were limited, the decision confirms the broad reach of the offence, which is committed where a person in the regulated sector discloses the existence of an ongoing money laundering investigation.

Background

In 2013, William Osmond, a solicitor, had acted for a client in connection with a £4 million loan used to finance the acquisition of a property in London. In the course of an investigation by the Serious Fraud Office (“SFO”) into Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation (“ENRC”), the SFO began examining the source of funds used in the property purchase; in 2018, the SFO issued notices to Mr Osmond under section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 compelling the production of certain information by him in connection with the property purchase.

Mr Osmond informed his client about the SFO’s inquiries, travelled to meet him, and later discussed with him how the SFO’s questions should be answered. He was subsequently convicted of tipping off contrary to section 333A(3) POCA in respect of these acts and of forgery, contrary to section 1 of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 after creating and supplying a backdated engagement letter to the SFO. His appeal against conviction was dismissed.

Section 333A(3) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (“POCA”) makes it an offence for a person to disclose that a money laundering investigation is being contemplated or carried out where the disclosure is likely to prejudice that investigation and the information came to the person in the course of a business in the regulated sector.

The appellant argued that the alleged disclosure was not caught because the information originated from the SFO, rather than being obtained through his regulated business activities. He also argued that the relevant investigation was the widely publicised ENRC investigation, meaning that the client already knew about it. 

The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments.

Key Findings

1. A specific line of inquiry may constitute a separate investigation

The Court accepted the prosecution’s case that the relevant disclosure was not the existence of the broad ENRC investigation, but the fact that the SFO was specifically investigating potential money laundering connected with the London property transaction. Even though that inquiry formed part of a wider investigation, it remained capable of constituting a separate investigation for the purposes of section 333A(3). It was therefore irrelevant that Mr Osmond’s client may already have known about the broader ENRC investigation (and that the ENRC investigation was subsequently found by the High Court to be flawed and triggered by improper conduct). What mattered was that Mr Osmond’s client did not know that the particular transaction was under scrutiny.

2. Information received from investigators can still be received “in the course of” regulated business

The Court also confirmed that the source of the information is not determinative. The relevant question is the capacity in which the recipient receives it. Mr Osmond received the SFO’s inquiries because he had acted as solicitor on a real estate and client money transaction falling within the regulated sector. Accordingly, the element of the offence was satisfied.

3. Actual prejudice is not required

The Court emphasised that the prosecution need not prove that an investigation was in fact prejudiced. The statutory test is whether the disclosure was likely to prejudice the investigation at the time it was made. The Court observed that informing the target of an investigation will often be inherently likely to prejudice that investigation because of the risk that evidence may be destroyed, altered or coordinated.

Comments

The decision is understood to be the first Court of Appeal authority on section 333A(3) POCA and provides welcome clarification on a small number of issues.

It confirms that the scope of tipping off covers information from any source that a person in the regulated sector receives in the course of their business in the regulated sector, the disclosure of which “is likely to” prejudice a money laundering investigation.

While the case under appeal concerned deliberate disclosure, it is important to note that there is no requirement for intent or recklessness in relation to the offence. The offence is committed where: a person discloses that a money laundering investigation is being contemplated or carried out; that disclosure is likely to prejudice that investigation; and the information came to the person in the course of a business in the regulated sector. Nothing more is required.

The case is a useful reminder that all persons, especially those in the regulated sector, should exercise caution when handling an inquiry from authorities investigating money laundering. Inappropriate communications with clients concerning that investigation may themselves create significant criminal exposure under POCA. The recent extension of corporate criminal liability for the acts of senior managers under s.250 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 means that, in principle, where a senior manager of an organisation commits a tipping off offence, the organisation itself may also be liable for the offence, irrespective of whether others in the organisation condoned or even knew of the relevant facts.

For further information, please contact a member of the Burges Salmon Corporate Crime and Investigations team: Corporate crime, investigations and inquiries | Burges Salmon.