Protectors and powers of consent in offshore trusts: Clarity from the Privy Council
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The Privy Council’s decision in A and 6 others v C and 13 others [2026] UKPC 11 provides guidance on the role of protectors in offshore trusts. The Board confirmed that, absent an express limitation in the trust instrument, protectors are entitled to exercise their own discretionary judgment on the merits of trustee proposals.
Protectors are a common feature in trusts in Bermuda and other offshore jurisdictions, that is rarely seen in UK based trusts. The rationale for them is to address situations where beneficiaries and settlors are located far from the jurisdiction of the trust and where the trustee has little or no knowledge of the needs of the settlor or beneficiaries.
The powers of protectors vary but often include powers to direct or veto:
The case concerned a group of discretionary family trusts established in the 1950s for the benefit of “A” and “B” and their families.[1] In the 1990s, common form provisions providing for the appointment of protectors were included in all but one of the trusts, in connection with moving the administration of a number of the trusts offshore from England to Bermuda.
Under these provisions, the Protectors have two main powers:
Notably, the trust deeds did not expressly define the scope of the Protectors’ role when deciding whether to give or withhold their consent.
In 2017, the Trustees developed proposals to restructure the trusts and divide the trust assets between A and A’s family branch, and B and B’s family branch, proposing a starting allocation of 2/3 to A and 1/3 to B. Aspects of the proposals required the Protectors’ consent. The Protectors considered that the proposed scheme did not serve the beneficiaries’ best interests, and so they were unlikely to consent. The Trustees sought a blessing of their proposal from the Supreme Court of Bermuda. This was opposed by B and B’s family and the Protectors, with the latter arguing that they were entitled to withhold their consent on the basis of their independent assessment of the proposals’ merits.
The question considered by the Bermudian courts was: is the role of the Protectors a wider role, which would entitle them to withhold consent based on their own assessment of the merits of the proposals, or a narrow role, which would limit them to confirming that the Trustees were acting lawfully and within the scope of the Trustees’ powers?
The first instance court preferred the narrow role, emphasising the substantive power to deal in the trust was vested solely in the Trustees and noting that a narrow role for the Protectors would still be valuable, allowing them to act as a communications bridge between beneficiaries and offshore trustees.
The Court of Appeal of Bermuda confirmed this approach saying that protectors should function as a watchdog and described a wider role for protectors as “at best a recipe for wasteful duplication and at worst an invitation for deadlock.”
The Privy Council unanimously rejected the binary approach adopted by the Bermudian courts and allowed the appeal. The Board held that the question that needed to be considered was not which of two predefined roles the settlor must have intended, but rather what constraints are actually imposed on the Protectors by the trust deed?
In this case, the trust instruments imposed no express limitation confining the role of the Protectors to a review of the lawfulness of the trustees’ decision-making. In the absence of express wording to the contrary, there is no basis for reading in a restriction that reduces that power to a purely supervisory function. The Board also rejected the argument that a narrow role for protectors could be imposed by an implied term, as this was neither necessary to make the trusts workable in practice or so obvious as to go without saying.
Other noteworthy findings include:
The case offers several key learning points:
If you have any questions in relation to the issues raised above, please contact the Burges Salmon team. This article was written by Justin Briggs and Harriette Alcock.
[1] The appeal was held in private due to the risk of a public hearing of the private affairs of children beneficiaries, and market consequences of the litigation for the company in which the trust settlements have substantial shareholding.
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