Key July Judgments from the Planning Court

As we approach the end of July, we wanted to highlight three cases which have been handed down this month by the High Court which have caught our attention. My colleague Maelor James sets out the key takeaways relating to the determination of TCPA schemes below.

R (Thomas) v London Borough of Lewisham [2026] EWHC 1840 (Admin)

The first decision concerns a judicial review challenge to the grant of planning permission for the redevelopment of an existing building to purpose-built student accommodation (PBSA). The claim was made on two grounds.

• The first ground concerned the interpretation of planning policy relating to PBSA. The claimant argued that various policies required a binding nominations agreement with a higher education provider to be in place before planning permission could lawfully be granted. The Court disagreed, recognising the commercial reality that universities are often unwilling to commit to such agreements until a scheme is well advanced. It held that evidence of engagement with a university, coupled with a section 106 obligation requiring the developer to use reasonable endeavours to secure an agreement before first occupation, was capable of satisfying policy requirements;

• The second ground referred to whether the grant of planning permission was irrational, or tainted by a failure to take account of a material consideration. This was on the basis that some planning obligations had largely been carried out by the time the decision was issued and were therefore unenforceable. The Court held that an agreement is not unlawful because obligations have been performed or there has been a change in factual circumstances.

The judgment provides useful reassurance that policy compliance can be assessed in a practical and proportionate manner rather than through an overly rigid reading of policy wording.

R (Manby) v Hackney [2026] EWHC 1543 (Admin)

In this decision, the High Court quashed a planning permission for a householder extension because the local planning authority failed properly to engage with supplementary planning guidance. The case centred on  Hackney's Residential Extensions and Alterations Supplementary Planning Document and, in particular, the "45-degree rule" used to assess impacts on amenity for neighbours. 

Although the officer's report acknowledged that the rule was relevant, it did not reach a conclusion on whether the proposal complied with it or, if not, why permission should be granted. The Court held that this was unlawful and that a decision-maker cannot simply refer to a policy or guideline without applying it and explaining the planning judgment that follows. 

The judgment is a timely reminder that "having regard to" a policy requires meaningful application rather than an acknowledgment. The Court's reasoning reinforces the importance of clear and transparent decision-making, especially in delegated decisions where the officer’s report often constitutes the decision-maker's reasoning. 

R (Faversham Town Council) v SSHCLG [2026] EWHC 1651 (Admin)

The final case provides important guidance on the status of flood risk policy within the planning balance. It concerned an outline permission for up to 250 dwellings where parts of the site and the principal access were at risk of flooding. Although the Inspector concluded that a sequential test ought to have been undertaken and that it’s absence conflicted with national policy, he nevertheless found that the development could be made safe through mitigation measures and would not result in any "real world" flood harm. Balancing that policy conflict against the benefits of the scheme, including much-needed housing delivery, the Inspector allowed the appeal, and the High Court upheld the decision.

An important aspect of the judgment is the Court's treatment of the revised NPPF and, in particular, the requirement in paragraph 11(d)(i) to identify a "strong reason" for refusal. The Court rejected attempts to give the phrase a rigid legal meaning, holding that whether a policy conflict constitutes a "strong reason" is ultimately a matter of planning judgment in the circumstances of the individual case. 

Equally important was the Court's reaffirmation that planning policy, including the NPPF, is not law. While decision-makers must have regard to policy, they may depart from it provided they do so consciously, give adequate reasons, and act rationally. The Court therefore accepted that the failure to undertake a sequential test did not automatically require the application to be refused and could be weighed against other material considerations.

If you have any queries on the determination of planning applications, please contact Maelor James or me.