Recent developments in the UK merger control and antitrust regimes

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This year has seen significant reforms to the UK merger control and antitrust regimes. The CMA has also recently introduced procedural reforms to improve its overall approach to mergers and is currently consulting on proposed changes to its mergers guidance on jurisdiction and procedure.
2025 has been a year of reform for the UK merger control and antitrust regimes. The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (“DMCCA”), which came into force earlier this year, introduced the most significant reforms to the UK competition law landscape since the Enterprise Act 2002 – from enhanced antitrust enforcement powers and the introduction of a new digital markets competition regime to revised merger control rules. In addition, in response to the UK government’s draft Strategic Steer to the Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”), the CMA has introduced procedural reforms aimed at driving economic growth, including four principles which will underpin its merger control work (“4Ps”).
We take a look at some of the key merger control and antitrust enforcement reforms below, including what this means for businesses and investors.
a) Revised merger control thresholds
The DMCCA introduced revised merger control thresholds for completed mergers where completion took place on or after 1 January 2025 and for anticipated mergers where the formal Phase 1 investigation commences on or after 1 January 2025.
The new merger control thresholds are as follows:
The new hybrid test brings into the scope of the regime transactions which were not previously caught or which the CMA would struggle to assert jurisdiction over. In particular, the hybrid test captures all types of mergers (horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate mergers) whereas the share of supply test only captures horizontal mergers. The hybrid test is acquirer-focused and will typically capture transactions where the acquirer meets both the 33% share of supply and the £350 million turnover thresholds. It is intended to capture the so-called ‘killer acquisitions,’ where larger incumbent companies acquire smaller promising competitors. This might it make it easier for the CMA to assert jurisdiction over transactions involving a target company with limited scale or presence in the UK.
Investors looking to acquire UK companies or assets, no matter the size, should be aware of the new thresholds and consider engagement with the CMA where appropriate.
b) Expedited Phase 2 merger process
The DMCCA introduced a formal fast track procedure for making Phase 2 references. Merging parties can submit a fast-track reference request during the pre-notification period or at any time before the end of the Phase 1 investigation (which lasts up to 40 working days) without having to concede to an adverse Phase 1 decision. This will enable investigations to be concluded more quickly than would otherwise be the case. Where the CMA has accepted a fast-track reference request, it will also be able to extend the Phase 2 deadline to provide flexibility where required. The fast-track procedure will not apply to water mergers or energy network mergers, which have their own regimes.
c) Antitrust enforcement powers
The DMCCA strengthens the CMA’s powers to investigate and enforce competition law as follows:
The combination of these new powers will strengthen the CMA’s ability to investigate potential breaches of competition law and enforce the rules. Companies subject to investigations should be aware of the scope of the CMA’s investigation powers so as to avoid potential penalties for non-compliance.
d) New Digital Markets Competition Regime
The DMCCA introduced a new digital markets competition regime which gives the CMA new functions related to the regulation of competition in digital markets. Under the new regime, the CMA has the power to designate companies with Strategic Market Status (“SMS”) in relation to a particular digital activity (e.g. the provision of a service by means of the internet, or the provision of one or more pieces of digital content linked to the UK) where certain jurisdictional conditions are met. The CMA has the power to impose conduct requirements on SMS companies and to introduce pro-competition interventions with the aim of achieving positive outcomes for UK consumers and businesses.
In addition, the SMS company will have an obligation to report planned mergers or acquisitions to the CMA prior to completion where they have a value of £25 million or more and a UK connection. The CMA has significant powers to investigate and enforce the new regime and has launched two SMS designation investigations since the regime came into force (the first investigation is looking into Google’s general search and search advertising services (the CMA is currently consulting on its proposed decision to designate Google as having SMS in general search services) and the second investigation is looking into Google and Apple’s mobile ecosystem services). However, the CMA announced that it expects to open three to four SMS investigations within the first year of the regime coming into force so it is likely there will more investigations launched this year.
In addition to changes introduced by the DMCCA, the CMA has recently introduced a number of procedural reforms aimed at updating and improving its approach to mergers. Having obtained feedback from businesses and investors, and in response to the UK government’s draft Strategic Steer to the CMA, the CMA announced procedural reforms in February 2025 aimed at driving economic growth, and business and investor confidence. In particular, the CMA announced the 4Ps which will underpin is approach to UK merger processes and issued a consultation on 20 June 2025 on its draft updated guidance on jurisdiction and procedure which seeks to embed the 4Ps. The 4Ps and updated process reflected in the draft guidance are as follows:
Burges Salmon has significant experience advising UK and international companies on UK merger control, antitrust rules and antitrust investigations. If you have any questions in relation to the issues raised in this article, please contact Chris Worrall or your usual Burges Salmon contact.
This article was written by Sandra Mapara.