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Thought Leadership

When one share price is the wrong incentive

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We have been working on a number of tracker share projects recently. The businesses, structures and economics have all been different, but the underlying issue has been remarkably similar.

Tracker shares (not phantom shares) are hardly new. What may be changing is the problem they are increasingly being asked to solve.

More businesses now sit within structures where the company whose shares can conveniently be used for an incentive is not the same as the business, asset or portfolio whose performance management is actually expected to drive. Infrastructure platforms hold multiple projects through separate SPVs, private-capital groups build portfolios through acquisition and businesses are frequently reorganised, combined or rolled into new vehicles ahead of transactions.

Conventional equity often assumes that this does not matter. The employee works for Company A, Company A becomes more valuable and the employee participates in that increase in value. In many situations, that remains exactly the right answer.

The position becomes less convincing where someone is responsible for a particular investment, business line or portfolio within a much larger group. If that part of the business performs exceptionally well while the wider group does not, the group share price may no longer be measuring the thing management is actually being asked to influence.

That is where tracker shares become interesting.

The attribution problem

Take an investment business with ten assets.

One team manages three of them. Those investments perform exceptionally well, while the remaining seven disappoint and the value of the company barely moves. Ordinary shares expose the team to the overall outcome.

By contrast, a tracker can isolate the relevant investments and link returns to their performance. The employee still owns shares in a single company, but the rights attaching to those shares are determined by reference to a particular investment, division or portfolio. The organisational chart and the incentive map no longer need to be the same thing.

There is though an important qualification. A tracker may identify where value has arisen, but it does not necessarily identify who created it. A wind farm may become more valuable because management develops and operates it well. It may also benefit from higher power prices, cheaper financing or broader market conditions. Likewise, a portfolio may outperform because of investment skill or factors outside management's control.

Identifying the right pool of value is therefore only the first step. The incentive must still determine what return management should participate in, what capital comes back first, whether there is a hurdle and how subsequent investment is treated.

A tracker identifies the relevant economics. It does not determine how those economics should be shared.

Infrastructure makes the point particularly clearly

Infrastructure provides a useful illustration and is one which I have written about before. Read here.

A renewables group may own wind, solar and battery-storage assets through multiple project companies, while a team is responsible for a single wind farm. If that team receives ordinary shares in the wider group, its outcome depends on everything else the group owns. The wind farm may materially outperform, yet that outperformance can be diluted by weakness elsewhere.

At the other extreme, management could invest directly into the project company. Economically, that is clean, but it becomes impractical where a platform owns dozens of SPVs and people move between assets.

A tracker can sit between those positions. A holding company can own the wind-farm SPV and issue shares whose economics follow that investment, giving management exposure to the asset without joining the cap table of every project company.

This becomes particularly relevant where assets may be held for 10, 15 or 20 years. Value may be created through development, operation, refinancing, yield and capital recycling long before any ultimate exit. A tracker can help identify which value management should participate in, although it does not answer when that value can be realised.Those are separate design questions.

Sometimes the economic unit is a portfolio

A tracker does not have to follow a single asset.

Investments made over a particular period may be grouped into a vintage, with management receiving tracker shares linked to the portfolio as a whole. The economic unit is then the collection of investments managed together.

That changes behaviour. Deal-by-deal participation can reward one exceptional investment even where other decisions disappoint. Portfolio participation encourages management to think about capital allocation, portfolio construction and long-term stewardship across the whole vintage.

For some investment businesses, that may better reflect what management is actually being asked to do.

Which leads to the key question: what is management responsible for?

Sometimes the answer is the company. Sometimes it is a division, asset or portfolio. The instrument should follow that answer rather than determine it.

Physical and synthetic trackers

There is also a useful structural distinction. I use "physical" and "synthetic" here as descriptive labels rather than legal terms.

With a physical tracker, the company issuing the shares owns the underlying asset being tracked. A holding company might own the wind-farm SPV and issue a separate class of shares whose economics follow that investment.

A synthetic tracker creates greater separation. The underlying asset may sit elsewhere in the structure, with the economics recreated through an agreed formula.

That can be valuable where financing, regulatory or corporate constraints dictate where assets sit. But the further the tracker moves from the underlying asset, the more work valuation, funding and drafting need to do.

Viewed broadly, there is a spectrum:

Direct co-investment → Physical tracker → Synthetic tracker → Phantom equity

None is inherently better than the others. They simply create different degrees of separation between management and the economics that are being measured.

When a growth share loses its reference point

Tracker shares can also solve problems created by reorganisations.

Suppose management holds growth shares in a company and participates above an agreed hurdle. That company is subsequently rolled into a larger group, perhaps as part of a pre-IPO restructuring or wider reorganisation.

A properly calibrated exchange can preserve the value of management's existing holding at the transaction date. The harder question is what happens afterwards.

If those growth shares simply become ordinary equity in the enlarged group, management's future return may be driven by businesses that were never part of the original incentive design. The hurdle may also lose much of its economic significance because the company against which it was calibrated is now only one part of a larger enterprise.

A tracker can preserve the original reference point. The corporate structure can evolve while management continues to participate by reference to the business against which the original bargain was struck.

The broader principle is straightforward: a corporate reorganisation should not automatically rewrite what management's incentive was designed to measure.

But narrower is not always better

There is an obvious temptation with tracker shares. If more precise attribution is possible, why not make the incentive as precise as possible? The reason not to do that is because sometimes the noise is the point.

Group equity can encourage collaboration, movement of talent and opportunities across a business, and attention to financing, reputation and wider commercial outcomes. Management may make decisions that are good for the group even if they are not optimal for their own business unit.

A highly targeted tracker can encourage the opposite behaviour. It can reinforce silos, generate disputes about cost allocation, discourage movement between teams and lead managers to optimise for one part of the organisation rather than the whole.

The objective is therefore not maximum precision. It is finding the right balance between local accountability and enterprise-wide alignment.

Precision has a price

Nevertheless, tracker shares can create cleaner, more precise incentive economics, but that precision needs to be designed.

Someone must decide what sits within the tracked pool, how costs and capital are allocated, how debt is treated, how value is measured and how participants ultimately realise value. Those decisions matter because they can materially affect outcomes.

The more precise the tracker, the more important its boundaries become.

That does not mean every decision needs to be hard-wired. Most businesses need flexibility to respond to changing circumstances. However, where a decision can materially alter the economics of the tracker, the governance framework should be sophisticated enough to match the structure.

The same principle applies to liquidity. A perfectly designed tracker linked to a wind farm may still be a poor incentive if management cannot realise value for twenty years.

Attribution and liquidity are again separate design questions.

When tracker shares are worth it

I would start with three questions.

What is the right unit? Is the company, asset, division or portfolio the right thing to measure?

What is the right return? What opening value, hurdle or capital baseline determines the return management should participate in?

What is the right degree of isolation? Will separating that unit improve incentives overall, or weaken collaboration and group-wide decision-making?

Only then would I decide on the instrument.

Growth shares may be better where company-level value is the appropriate measure. Direct co-investment may be preferable where management should genuinely participate at asset level. Carry may already solve the problem with a fund structure. Sometimes a cash arrangement is all that is required.

Tracker shares become compelling where the legal entity and the source of value have drifted apart, but management still needs a genuine equity interest linked to that specific pool of economics.

The wider point

We often start incentive design with instruments: options, growth shares, LTIPs, carried interest or phantom equity. Tracker shares are a useful reminder that there is an earlier question to answer: what should management be measured against?

Often the answer is straightforward. The company creates value, management helps create it and ordinary equity provides the right incentive.

Increasingly, however, businesses sit within more complex ownership structures where the legal entity issuing the shares and the economic unit creating value are no longer the same thing. Simply awarding ordinary equity may then fail to produce the intended alignment.

The difficult part is rarely selecting the instrument. It is deciding what should be measured, what returns should count and how much exposure to the wider enterprise should remain.

Only once those questions have been answered does it make sense to decide what form the incentive should take.

At Burges Salmon, we advise companies, investors and management teams on incentive arrangements where conventional equity does not adequately reflect the underlying economics, including growth shares, management incentive plans, co-investment arrangements and bespoke tracker share structures.

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